

21 July 1952

Mr. Edward T. Dickinson, Vice Chairman
National Security Resources Board
Executive Office of the President
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Ed:

Thank you for sending along the paper by Mr. Smock.
It is encouraging that our Executive agencies have in
them these brighter young men who are willing to depart
from the usual lines in their thinking.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Deputy Director

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NSC review(s) completed.

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**

OFFICE OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN

July 14, 1952

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Allen:

Herewith is an interesting paper developed by one of our brighter young men who used to serve on the staff of Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey. I am sending it to you, informally and without endorsement, because I thought you would find it stimulating.

Sincerely,



Edward T. Dickinson
Vice Chairman

Enclosure

The Defense Alliance System

Is the border-defense alliance system upon which NATO is based still the deterrent to aggression that it has been throughout Western Civilization? Does it still provide the protection which led to its development? Is there another concept upon which the West can base its present alliance policies?

I. Introduction

Western Civilization since its development has relied on a system of border-defense alliances to deter aggression. This system has been used to great advantage against aggressors both outside of and within the Western community of nations. The defense alliance was developed to supply two very important needs: First, the alliance permitted small nations to band together militarily and fight off strong aggressors; and second, the border defense set up by the alliance protected the heartland of each nation from being devastated by the aggressor.

This system has worked as well as any could, since it allowed the joint forces to meet the aggression at the threatened point, and it required the aggressor to have sufficient forces to overwhelm the defensive alliance. Throughout most of the history of Western Civilization, this system was implemented or assisted by the military fact that the aggressor needed superior forces to defeat inferior defensive forces. The defense alliance system has failed when military innovations gave the aggressor an offensive advantage. There are many examples of this situation and history points out that the side that recognized the new innovation first won the war. These new innovations were "shortly" adopted for the defense and once again

the defense alliance deterred aggression and protected the heartland of the allied nations.

We should now examine the defense alliance system of today to determine whether it supplies the protection and deterrent to war for which it was developed. We tend to take the system for granted since we in our civilization know nothing else. To us it is about as basic as the law of gravity, but is it as sound?

In looking at the defense alliance system today, note that it did not protect Paris and London in the last war or Korea today. Second, notice that it does not deter aggression as it once did. An example of this is the fact that Germany did not in the First World War learn the "classical" lesson that aggression was costly, but learned instead that the invaded France was hurt more than they the aggressor. There have been two World Wars in a generation and a third one threatens.

There are many critics of the present system who threaten to wreck Western policy and programs. Each of these critical groups recognizes the frustration set up by the weakness of the border defense alliance system as it affects his interests.

This can be seen in the French attitude of "What's the use -- we cannot protect France and why should we work for the United States?" This antagonizes the American Congress who threaten to cut French aid unless they do their share. Another group is the Hoover-Taft followers that advocate pulling U. S. forces out of Europe and relying on air power to protect the U. S. and deter the Russians. This, of course, antagonizes the European allies. Further there is the European feeling that they cannot support large armies while Germany can. They logically worry that if Russia is dealt with then

Germany will conquer them by default. The reaction of European neutrality to American isolationism and vice versa could get out of control and destroy NATO or the very cost of the NATO Defense Program could destroy U. S. and European economy.

II. Is There Another System?

The border defense alliance system is the only defense against aggression that we know in Western Civilization. However, it is possible that another system could be developed by using parts of programs developed by two famous Asiatic leaders. The first is the military organization of Genghis Khan, and the second is the passive resistance of Mohatma Gandhi. Genghis Khan's conquests were carried out by his "flying squadron" which was a force of 10,000 well-trained and disciplined horsemen. After the conquest of an area, rather than establish border defenses, the Mongols kept their squadrons in strategic camps or even back in the heartland of the Gobi Desert. When an area under the jurisdiction of the Mongols was attacked, the squadrons would retaliate against the homeland of the "aggressor" nation rather than meet the larger invading forces; then, as the invaders retreated to protect their own nation, the Mongols would fight them at a place and time of their choosing.

This system was also used in the administration of conquered lands. There were no permanently stationed Mongol occupation troops but ambassadors, tax collectors and messengers went throughout Asia unescorted. If anything happened to these officials, the squadrons or parts thereof would move out of their bases and devastate the area in which the Khan's officials were interfered with. The result of this policy was that the conquered peoples acted as protectors of the agents of the Khan since they knew the results of any "insult" to the Khan.

This Mongol System was beaten by the development of defensive weapons which meant that cities could protect themselves, and the Khan could no longer rule large areas with his strategic "flying squadrons." This is noted in Kirchner's "An Outline History of Russia" where he states that after nearly 250 years of Mongol rule in Russia "the introduction of latest artillery, ever since considered a weapon of prime importance to the Russian Army, did much to move the balance (against the Mongols) in Moscow's favor." The question is: Could the Khan today outflank or fly over Russian artillery?

The second Asiatic policy was that of Gandhi in India who, like the Khan, did not resist the initial invasion but rather than retaliating as the Khan did, Gandhi used passive resistance to make the occupation more difficult than it was worth. Perhaps the West could develop a policy from the principles taught by these two men.

III. A Passive Defense Retaliation Alliance

This system would be developed around three types of forces:

1. National Security Forces.
2. Alliance Strategic Area Defense Forces.
3. Alliance Retaliation Forces.

This concept is based on the premise that the present day defense of vulnerable areas results in the destruction of those areas, as well as their defending forces which are the "cream" of the alliance armies. This new concept would allow the alliance to throw all of its might against the territory of the aggressor rather than dissipating it in defense within the territory of the defending nation. These vulnerable areas would be declared "open areas", and there would be no need for an aggressor to launch an atomic attack on large industrial facilities and cities within that area. The

resulting retaliation against the aggressor would act as a deterrent to aggression, and the heartland of the alliance would be "protected" from unnecessary destruction. As Genghis Khan foresaw, the troops that invaded his territory would have to retreat after the destruction of their home bases or would fall easy prey to a subsequent attack.

The following is a description of possible NATO, etc. forces:

A. National Security Forces.

Each nation in the alliance would maintain national security forces to protect the internal security of the nation and to defend the nation against any attack short of organized aggression by another nation. The security forces would be much smaller than the present-day national standing armies and would not be equipped with heavy weapons. Such forces would be highly trained to act as national police in time of peace and saboteurs in event of war. When an allied nation was invaded, these forces would not resist the attack but in accordance with highly developed plans, would cripple the economy of their nation. Rather than destroy whole cities, factories and houses, they would remove or destroy key communication links, machines and facilities the moment their borders were crossed. They could then either leave these areas and join other alliance forces (below) or go underground according to plan in order to maintain the neutralization of the economy of their nation as long as the aggressor remained in occupation.

In today's situation, it would take the Russians at least a year or two to restore the complicated key machines and facilities in Europe.

B. Alliance Strategic Area Defense Forces.

The alliance would determine what areas were strategic using the test of what areas were the production heart of the alliance (U. S., Japan, etc.), and what areas were strategic retaliation bases (North Africa, etc.). A further test of a "strategic area" would be the defensibility of that area.

The alliance would maintain land, sea and air forces very much like the present NATO forces to defend the strategic areas. These NATO forces then would not be lost or nearly destroyed in a Dunkirk type action if Europe fell, but would be where they were least vulnerable and could best protect the production and retaliation bases necessary to take the fight to the aggressor's homeland.

C. Alliance Retaliation Forces.

The alliance would maintain in strategic areas throughout the world land, sea and air forces for an attack on the aggressor -- forces which could hit the aggressor at places chosen by the alliance rather than at places where the aggressor chooses to strike. These forces would be of various kinds. Some would act immediately; others in the early stages of the war after the first raiders had destroyed the enemy's communication, and still others when joined by elements of the national security forces and strategic area defense forces could be used for the knock-out blow against the aggressor.

IV. Results

If this system could be developed it would mean that if Russia invaded Europe and were defeated, the economy of Europe, although hurt by Russian occupation, would not be destroyed as it was in the last war. Many people

would be harmed and killed by the occupation but not as many as would die from an atomic assault by the Russians on Europe. On the other hand, the Russian nation would be hurt to a much greater extent.

If Russia was faced by such an alliance, she would find that her first attack would be not across the level German plain, but through Suez to North Africa and across the Far East in an attempt to reach our forces in strategic strongholds; or she might have to be sure she could quickly take the German redoubt area as well as well-defended areas somewhere in the Pacific. She would be faced with attacking such areas in exchange for retaliation blows against Moscow and the heart of Russian industry. Even Hitler would not have traded the destruction of Bengasi for the destruction of the Ruhr and Berlin.

In addition, this system would make it even more clear that the West is not proposing the rearming of Germany and Japan per se, but rather the integration of their forces into an alliance to discourage future aggression.

Finally, if desirable, it would be relatively easy to switch over from this alliance system to a U. N. Police Force which would include all nations.

Paul T. Smock